One of former Prime Minister Martin’s major policy priorities was to restore “pride and influence” to Canada’s foreign policy. His government’s 2005 International Policy Statement suggested that Canada had escaped the relative isolationism of the Chrétien years, in which international trade considerations and the promotion of Canadian values dominated Canadian foreign policy. Instead, given the solid foundations of the federal budget and the restoration of “fiscal sovereignty,” the Canadian government declared that it was ready to act. Whether it was by engaging Canada and Canadians in “hotspots” like the Sudan or Haiti, speaking about the importance of the United Nations and coordinated international development efforts, promoting ideas like the G-20, or musing publicly about the evolving relationship of the NAFTA countries, the Martin government was intent on restoring Canada’s pride of place as an engaged international actor, reinforcing an important dimension of the Canadian identity.

However, in some cases, federal government actions (or inaction) contradicted the public rhetoric. This is not merely a case of political posturing: “rhetoric-reality gaps” have serious effects not only on Canada’s international partners, be they countries or aid groups, but also on the Canadian polity. Such contradictions reinforce “brand politics,” in which the political manipulation of the Canadian identity benefits the ruling party by framing policy initiatives (whether implemented or not) in terms of “Canadian values” that appeal to the Canadian citizenry’s renewed sense of national pride. Policy initiatives and pronouncements are framed in terms of a distinctive Canadian value set that limits the ideological spectrum and clash of ideas necessary for debating policy. Historically, distinctive Canadian values emerged due to competing ideological visions: negotiated policies had to respect the multidimensional levels of Canadian diversity, such as class, ethnicity, region, and gender. In this way, Canada can be seen as an ongoing experiment with policies and initiatives that reflect the negotiation of diversity: a unique form of federalism, integrated policies of bilingualism and multiculturalism, redistributive policies reflected in the welfare state, public health care, peacekeeping, and the desire to be a middle power internationally.

However, this notion of the “caring and sharing Canadian” (Armstrong, 1996) (Brodie, 2002) has been superseded by the rise of the “entrepreneurial Canadian,” who focuses much less on social policy than on questions of neoliberal restructuring in light of heightened globalization (Brodie, 2002). The diversity that historically marked the Canadian experiment has been assigned a strategic yet secondary role. In the era of the “brand state,” countries transform national narratives in order to present distinctive images in order to attract foreign investment and skilled labour (Van Ham, 2001). Canadian diversity has become a key element of the transformed Canadian narrative, and even a selling point for neoliberal restructuring (Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002).

Consequently, there is a paradoxical nature to the Canadian identity. There is a growing emphasis on asserting a unique and distinctive Canadian identity, even though the policy foundations of the Canadian identity reduce the role that ideological diversity plays in Canada (Nimijean, 2005). Leaders emphasize “shared Canadian values” in response to political challenges, be they to address concerns of Canadian sovereignty internationally, or to respond to domestic political challenges, notably in terms of implementing a neoliberal policy agenda and in tackling the national unity file (Nimijean, 2006a).

Thus, branding Canada has had an explicitly political dimension. Reframing debates about public policy in terms of “Canadian values” has effectively reduced the scope of ideological diversity in Canada, which is one of the foundations of the Canadian political culture (Bell, 1992) (Resnick, 1994). The roots of “Brand Canada” can be traced to former Prime Minister Chrétien. He argued (Chrétien, 2000) that there was a “Canadian Way” in which historic Canadian policies reflected socially progressive yet fiscally conservative values. This forced both the political Left and Right, which Chrétien successfully framed as being outside of the Canadian consensus, to redefine their policy agendas in terms of the Liberal middle. Combined with the growing concentration of power in Canadian central institutions (Savoie, 1999), the political executive in the brand state has the advantage of defining policies in terms of Canadian values, a situation that benefits the Liberal Party, given its dominance of Canadian politics (Clarkson, 2005)[5]. Thus, political opponents must respond to an agenda set by the executive.[6] 

It is therefore useful to examine Canadian foreign policy through the emerging lens of brand politics, for the two most recent declarations of foreign policy have emphasized distinctive Canadian values as a constituent element of Canada’s place in the world. For example, the 1995 foreign policy statement, Canada in the World, emphasized “the projection of Canadian values and culture” as the “third pillar” of foreign policy, arguably in support of the first pillar, the “promotion of [Canadian] prosperity and employment.” The 2005 foreign policy statement, as much as it seeks to distinguish the Martin government from the Chrétien government,[7] continued the Chrétien theme of celebrating and exporting Canadian values, and emphasized the need to restore Canada’s “pride and influence” in the world. Polls have shown that this approach is popular domestically, reflecting a view that the Canadian identity is partly shaped by a notion of “humane internationalism” (Pratt, 1996).

“Selling diversity” (Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002) is central to the efforts to transform the national narrative. In this worldview, Canada is defined as a country that embraces diversity, is economically diverse, and is internationally distinct (especially from the Americans). This sentiment was reflected in comments made by David Kilgour, former Secretary of State for Asia-Pacific. He framed Canada in terms of its “Asianification,” due to close immigration, education, and economic links between Canada and other countries of the Asia-Pacific region. Diversity, most tellingly, was the first selling point to Asians: “our country offers an alternative concept in North America to that of our closest neighbour. Our brand in the world today is diversity and inclusiveness. We are a non-colonizing power[8] that believes in constructive multilateralism.” However, the motivation for closer ties with Asia-Pacific countries was economic. Kilgour noted the growing dependence on the US for Canadian exports and the potential for profitable relations between Canada and the Asia-Pacific countries. To be successful, however, he argued that it was necessary to rebrand Canada’s image in the Asia-Pacific, because the general impression of Canada too often was that it was simply a nice place to visit with friendly people (Kilgour, 2002).

Thus, “branding Canada” has become a key activity in the Canadian Foreign Service, as seen in the following 2003 passage from the web site of the Public Affairs Section of the Canadian High Commission in India:

Our goal is to help civil society in India and Canada interact and share their knowledge and perspectives. We do this through three primary means: promoting academic relations, sponsor and cultural exchanges and public diplomacy. Public diplomacy involves the projection of Canadian values, such as respect for human rights, participatory democracy, the rule of Law, sustainable development and fair trade. The common theme is “Branding Canada,” that is to say, making Indians more aware of Canada and what makes Canada unique as an innovative, dynamic, open, and multicultural society.

Nevertheless, this concerted image transformation exercise creates a challenge. Given that the primary orientation of Canadian foreign policy is economic (and more specifically, to promote Canadian economic interests), and given that the branding exercise was motivated by a concern that Canada, in the new globalized environment, was losing its share of global Foreign Direct Investment, a factor that was perceived as hurting Canadian growth prospects, does public diplomacy as defined by the Canadian government downplay what is really at stake for Canada?

The articulated ideals of Canadian foreign policy often stand in contradistinction to the promotion of Canada’s more narrow economic interests that drive much of the foreign policy agenda. The legacy of former Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy, who was well known for promoting the human security agenda, is instructive. As Stairs (2001) notes, he did so in an era of diminished responsibility for his office and fewer resources. Stairs argues that Axworthy could be seen as trying to make the “peripheral” central to Canadian foreign policy, noting that the “optics” of such low-cost initiatives played well in the political domestic environment. Thus, critics could argue “that his initiatives were tolerated by his colleagues in the government because they provided useful cosmetic cover for Canada’s real foreign policy, a policy that was actually rooted in preoccupations of a material kind and that was focusing ever more tightly on the United States” (Stairs, 2001: 35).

Indeed, numerous foreign policy scholars (among many, see Cohen, 2003; Nossal, 2004; Stairs, 2003) have criticized the federal government’s foreign policy orientation, noting variously that Canada has substantially cut back its international efforts in support of more action, that it is rather presumptuous to claim that Canada has a monopoly on certain values, and that the realization of such goals exceeds the capacity of Canada to promote them. In other words, the values articulated by the federal government often do not correspond with its public policy actions. This introduces the possibility of a rhetoric-reality gap, rooted in the articulation of values as a substitute for policy actions. Kading offers a succinct critique of this approach, recognizing that the exercise of values projection in support of Canadian economic interests could tarnish the historic foundation of Canada’s image abroad: “As Canada’s good reputation abroad appears to be used to achieve more important strategic trade goals, it is perhaps worth reflecting on precisely which values we are exporting” (Kading, 2003: 322). In short, the political manipulation of the Canadian identity can introduce a rhetoric-reality gap into the realm of international relations that harms Canada’s reputation, making it more difficult to interact with international partners and to achieve its goals.

The problem lies in the conflation of the primary goals of Canadian foreign policy. Since the 1995 Canadian foreign policy statement (and arguably since the early 1980s when External Affairs and International Trade were fused), trade policy and dealing with globalization have been core elements of foreign policy. The “projection of Canadian values and culture,” articulated in the 1995 foreign policy statement, was an important support for the economic goals, and contributed to a transformed image. As Copeland notes, the goals of prosperity and security were “sufficiently generic” to allow for any activity to be undertaken, while the goal of exporting Canadian values and culture “lacked substance and existed mainly in the realm of exhortation” (Copeland, 2001: 153). Nevertheless, cultural activities became a new pillar of the prosperity agenda of Canadian foreign policy. For example, “Canada in the World” noted how the “vitality of our culture is also essential to our economic success.”

The goals of foreign policy therefore appear to be in conflict. On the one hand, there is the desire to pursue the laudable goal of human security, a goal set out most clearly by Lloyd Axworthy, reflected in many speeches by Prime Ministers Chrétien and Martin, and characterized as an embodiment of Canadian values. On the other hand, the Canadian government’s economic goals led it to pursue policies and trade agreements that do not always mesh well with the goal of human security (see Gecelovsky and Keating, 2003).

Thus, there appears to be a tension between domestic interests, international goals, and the projection of national narratives abroad. For example, Canadian continental relations with the United States and Mexico are in a state of uncertainty, due to the tensions between international interests and domestic political concerns. To be sure, the Canadian government has emphasized a strengthened relationship with its NAFTA partners. Prime Minister Martin promised to improve Canada-US relations, following a series of events post-9/11 that strained the relationship.[9] He appointed a parliamentary secretary responsible for Canada-US relations who would report directly to him, and appointed a high-profile former New Brunswick premier, Frank McKenna, as Ambassador to the United States. The 2005 foreign policy statement emphasizes the revitalization of North American relations. Martin worked closely with his NAFTA partners on political, security and economic issues, culminating in the 2005 Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America. This builds on efforts to deepen the Canada-Mexico relationship since the signing of the NAFTA accord in 1995,[10] reflecting Canada’s increasingly regional outlook in its international relations (Kading, 2003).[11]

Nevertheless, the Martin government introduced tensions into continental relations, and especially Canada-US relations. These actions were influenced by the significant domestic political considerations associated with this regional relationship, given growing Canadian suspicions about closer integration with the United States.[12] A recurring theme of the Martin government was Canadian sovereignty and standing up for Canadian interests despite American wishes. As was seen in the 2004 federal election, Prime Minister Martin was quite willing to assume the mantle of the prime defender of Canadian sovereignty, even if it meant “standing up” to the Americans. He challenged Conservative Party leader Stephen Harper on the supposed “Americanizing” effects of his tax cuts (even though Martin boasted about producing the largest tax cuts in Canadian history, and in late 2005 introduced an additional $30 billion in planned tax cuts), noting that the lower level of taxes in the USA produced a different kind of society. He called Harper a “timid hawk” for not standing up to the Americans, and took the Americans to task for not dealing with the softwood lumber issue. In all of these examples, foreign policy issues are being used to promote domestic partisan political interests, and have been noticed abroad, as seen in recent speeches by American Ambassador to Canada David Wilkins, who asked the Canadian government to not fan the flames of anti-Americanism (see also Cellucci, 2005).

The political dimension of foreign policy under the Liberals was most noticeable in the decision to not participate in the American plan for continental missile defence, which was justified in the name of defending Canadian sovereignty. This was surprising, given that Martin had expressed support for the idea during the 2003 Liberal leadership campaign, and because it was believed that an agreement on Canada’s participation had been reached before the 2004 federal election (with a decision to be announced following the election).[13]

However, being reduced to minority government status forced the Liberal Party to respect a concerned Canadian public, which had widespread concerns about the war in Iraq and the continental missile defense plan. This was particularly the case in Prime Minister Martin’s home province of Québec, which was overwhelmingly against both the war in Iraq and continental missile defence. Framing the issue in terms of Canadian sovereignty and the weaponization of space allowed the Prime Minister to claim that Canada would not join the American initiative, even though Ambassador McKenna revealed that the issue was moot, since the 2004 amendments to the NORAD agreement meant that Canada was already part of the initiative (Campion-Smith, 2005).

Development assistance is another foreign policy field subject to the politics of branding and the rhetoric-reality gap. Paul Martin Jr. raised the profile of this issue, for example by promoting the idea of a G-20 as a means to extend influence beyond the richest nations in the world. He drew more attention to this issue by inviting rock singer and poverty activist Bono of U2 to give an address to the Liberal Party convention in 2003 when Martin won the leadership. This was followed by several other prime ministerial initiatives highlighting Canada’s commitment to development and peace, be it working in Sudan or Haiti, pushing for increased debt relief for poor countries, or by passing Bill C-9, The Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act (which included provisions for inexpensive generic drugs to be exported to poor countries).

Nevertheless, Canada was often criticized for not taking the steps necessary or indeed possible to help development. The Mexican President criticized Canada at the summit meeting of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas in Québec for not meeting development commitments to help poorer countries (Kading, 2003). The reluctance or inability to act was also seen in the Canadian government’s slow response to the Asian tsunami disaster in December 2004, and in terms of the global push to raise awareness of the importance of development assistance, led by singer Bob Geldof and the Live-8 concerts that coincided with the G-8 summit. Canada’s failure to commit to reaching the United Nations’ target of 0.7% of GDP devoted to development awakened many Canadians to the political ramifications of excessive rhetoric, and raised eyebrows internationally. For many, Martin was seen as siding with President Bush’s reluctance to increase international development, in contradistinction to the desire of the G-8’s European members to commit to the aid target. Moreover, despite passing Bill C-9 18 months ago, no new drugs had reached Africa due to bureaucratic delays (including one year to enact the legislation).]14]

Thus, the rhetorical celebration of Canadian values and ideals often runs up against the stiff reality of the political calculations that inform Canadian foreign policy. This became clear when Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew stated that Canada needed an “independent foreign policy which is an activist one,” in order to score political points with Canadian nationalists and against Québécois sovereignists.[15]

In this sense, Prime Minister Martin’s government continued the pattern of branding Canada, as developed by his predecessor Jean Chrétien. In the Liberal Party’s version of “Brand Canada,” Chrétien transformed the international image and narrative of Canada. In the Chrétien years, Canadian values were celebrated, as were transformed national narratives seeking to increase Canadian international competitiveness. This reflects van Ham’s observation (2001a) that in an era of globalization, national governments have become increasingly engaged in the transformation of national images and narratives in order to enhance their competitiveness in the global economy. Initially developed for economic purposes, the “Brand Canada” narrative soon became a vehicle for communicating the Canadian identity to Canadians and became a useful political tool for domestic partisan purposes, contributing significantly to Chrétien’s ability to marginalize his political opponents by his redefinition of the Canadian identity, adding fiscal conservatism as a core Canadian value. Framing a partisan agenda in terms of Canadian values and not the Liberal Party allowed Chrétien to explain away any rhetoric-reality gap by pointing to the transformed nature of the Canadian identity, and this helps explain Chrétien’s success (Nimijean, 2005; Nimijean, 2006a).[16]

This included Chrétien’s foreign policy agenda which, with its growing focus on Africa, lent credence to the view that Canada had become more engaged internationally even though support for foreign aid declined during the Chrétien years. African development was the special theme of the G-8 Summit hosted by Canada in 2002, and Chrétien announced the $500 million “Canada Fund for Africa.” The senior Canadian diplomat who was Prime Minister Chrétien’s “Personal Representative for Africa” argues that this was an example of “prime ministerial leadership” (Fowler, 2004: 219-241).

However, this new commitment to African assistance was announced without context, namely the Chrétien government’s cuts to African assistance in its efforts to balance its own budget, or even as Cohen (2003: 98-9) notes, the estimated $200 to $500 million cost of the G-8 Summit itself. Indeed, until this change of emphasis, Canada’s international development efforts were marked by a concern for Canadian economic priorities and eliminating Canada’s deficit. As Andrew Cohen (2003) notes, Canada is one of the leading nations when it comes to “tied aid.” For example, the Canadian Council for International Cooperation reported that despite the $500 million “Canada Fund for Africa,” $100 million of the $420 million allocated as of 2003 was for private sector partnerships, that is, for Canadian for-profit firms to deliver water, energy, and other services (Fraser, 2002). The Canadian Council for International Cooperation (2002) reported a significant drop in assistance for sub-Saharan Africa: a 34% drop (in constant dollars) and a cumulative decrease of $1.6 billion between 1990 and 2000. Canadian official development assistance for all countries dropped by 31%. In the year 2000, Canada was 17th of 21 industrialized countries in the world in providing foreign aid, a drop from sixth place in 1995. Canada’s contribution was 0.25% of GDP, below the international average of 0.39%, and well below Canada’s high point of 0.75% in 1975 (Harper, 2002).

Prime Minister Martin continued the politics of branding upon assuming power. After a failed attempt to reposition the Liberal Party’s “Brand Canada” as “Brand Martin,” a strategy premised on presenting Martin as the leader of a party that did not publicly acknowledge Prime Minister Chrétien, Martin salvaged a minority government by adopting Chrétien’s strategy of positioning himself as a defender of a hard-line against Québec sovereignists, cautious and even tough with respect to the Americans, and a defender of progressive social policy. For example, Martin argued in support of “activist government,” despite the scaling back of the welfare state and the promotion of tax cuts and debt repayment that took precedence during his tenure as Finance Minister and Prime Minister. His support of same-sex marriage, meant to position the Conservatives as outside the mainstream of Canadian society, was framed in terms of Charter of Rights and Freedoms and not in terms of sexuality. “Martin the Prime Minister” was widely seen by pundits as contradicting “Martin the Finance Minister, backbencher, and leadership candidate,” reversing himself on issues like the Kyoto Accord, continental missile defence, same-sex marriage, and the war in Iraq. As one analyst wrote, “If Liberal values are Canadian values, as the party encourages voters to accept, then Mr. Martin veered dangerously close to being un-Canadian, and not particularly Liberal, as recently as last year. He campaigns to the left, but would he govern there?”[17] In this light, Martin’s alleged anti-Americanism in the 2004 and 2006 federal elections could be seen as a political ploy, for it did not have deep roots and contradicted his pro-continental orientation. For example, his first foreign trip after the 2004 election was to a meeting of leading American business leaders, where Martin spoke of three major themes: attracting American investment, “expanding and deepening Canada-U.S. ties” and restoring Canada’s international image (Delacourt, 2004).

The Canadian case demonstrates the need to further our understanding of the phenomenon of state branding. In particular, it is important to further our understanding of the domestic dimensions of state branding and how they relate to a state’s attempts to transform its national narrative. Canadian foreign policy goals and actions, developed to promote a country’s interests and agendas however they are determined, remain subject to the political machinations that drive the articulation of those interests and agendas. While Peter van Ham (2001b) suggests that domestic state branding can be seen as a redefined state-citizen relationship involving public relations and polling reflecting the growing consumerist orientation to citizenship, the Canadian case suggests that there is a connection between the domestic and international manifestations of the transformed national narrative. Domestically, international images and the projection of an international personality rooted in the celebration of “Canadian values” have become an important dimension of brand politics. In the case of Brand Canada, it can contribute to what some scholars have referred to as the “myth of Canadian superiority” (Campbell, 2000) as Canadians compare themselves to Americans. This sense of superiority has become a key part of a more assertive Canadian national identity, precisely because the policy-based nature of the Canadian identity has become less distinct in the past few decades: it has become more important to celebrate vocally the Canadian identity (Nimijean, 2005). The rhetoric of Canadian foreign policy has bolstered Canadian pride and a sense of distinctiveness from the Americans in particular, even though in many areas where Canadians claim to be living a distinct social contract, the evidence sometimes suggests otherwise. This includes Canada’s role as a global peacekeeper. While Canadians and their politicians see peacekeeping as central to their distinctive identity, the reality is that Canada, following the Canadian withdrawal from the Golan Heights, now ranks 50th in the world in terms of contributors to U.N. peacekeeping missions (Dorn, 2006).[18] Thus, as Jeffrey Simpson (2005) has noted, the idea that “the world needs more Canada” is backwards, for it feeds into “a smug national self-congratulation.”

This increases the political stakes for Canadian politicians in the international arena, who must respond both to the increasingly vocal national identity carefully nurtured by politicians and expressed by Canadians, and to the normal interactions and requirements of international negotiations. Excessive hyping of Canada’s nature and interests, not necessarily grounded in policy or actions, makes this more difficult. Thus, a failure to act according to stated values can tarnish a country’s reputation, undermining foreign policy initiatives. For example, the failure to commit to the 0.7% target has puzzled international observers. At the Progressive Governance Summit in October 2004, the Swedish Prime Minister, in announcing that his country would increase international assistance from 0.7% of GDP to 1%, challenged Canada to increase its assistance.[19] Canada’s ongoing refusal to commit to this target led to Sir Bob Geldof ’s proclamation that Canada was “weird” for failing to commit to achieving international development assistance goals that it established, and despite being in excellent fiscal health. This reflects the historic concerns of many, namely that “disappointed Canadians (and irate Americans) thus condemned an approach to foreign policy that apparently sought to minimize commitments while maximizing prestige” (Hillmer and Chapnick, 2001: 79).

This reminds us of the very important fact that international observers notice not only the good deeds that countries undertake, but also the failure to act or to live according to values or national narratives. This can be seen in the American reaction to Prime Minister Martin’s comments at the UN environmental summit in Montreal in early December 2005. During a press conference, Prime Minister Martin was widely seen as criticizing the Americans for not joining the next round of environmental negotiations, stating that in an era in which a “global conscience” demanded that countries work together, countries like the USA could not act alone. The American response simply pointed out that post-Kyoto, the American environmental record was in fact better than Canada’s. Martin’s rebuttal, playing to a domestic audience, was that the Prime Minister had to represent Canadian values, ignoring the policy record.

Writing in the influential New York Times (May 24, 2005), Canadian correspondent Clifford Krauss asked: “Was Canada too good to be true?” The article centred on the Martin government’s 2005 survival of a nonconfidence vote, to which the Prime Minister implied that it was not simply a victory for his party but a victory for the country: “We will set the standard by which other nations judge themselves.” The conscious effort to equate partisan political issues with national values is one of the dangers of national branding strategies. If the projection of national values exceeds the policy foundation of any transformed national narrative and are infused with partisan political manoeuvres, international relations become more complicated due to the rhetoric-reality gap. The projection of national values can quickly turn to preaching and hypocrisy, ignoring the domestic record, as Nossal (2004) notes. When looking at the Canadian record at home, he argues that in areas like liberal democracy and the electoral system, Aboriginal rights, discrimination in the area of sexuality, environmental degradation and energy consumption, and the growing wealth divide, the Canadian record is far from perfect, despite the Canadian tendency to hold others to account on these issues.[20]

It is increasingly recognized that offering a vision is insufficient. For example, Thomas Axworthy (2004) argues that it is time for Canadians to stop moralizing about Canadian virtues and values and to start investing in international activities. He notes that in 2003, The Centre for Global Development ranked Canada 18th of the 21 richest countries in the world, in terms of how their various international policies help poor countries. Thus, he suggests that Canada is “now in danger of becoming the Uriah Heep of the international community, promising great things but delivering little... Talk is cheap. Capacity costs money.” He notes that not only has Canadian international assistance been reduced by half since the 1970s (from 0.54% of GNP to 0.25%), but that Canadian trade barriers hurt developing countries by preventing them from accessing Canadian markets.

Thus, it is not simply that there are domestic political and economic factors to consider in determining foreign policy actions; rather, the balancing of the two, in an era of state branding, is problematic. How national states communicate the values underlying such actions, as an expression of national identity, both internationally and domestically, and how they use them politically, complicates the international-domestic nexus of international relations. As Stairs (2003: 253) notes, there is “growing evidence in their discourse on foreign affairs that Canadians are beginning to live on their own myths, myths they have come to think are real.” This international messaging affects Canadians directly. For example, Martin’s “defense” of Canadian interests and values was directed, for electoral purposes, at a more proud and independent Canadian citizenry which was wary of closer ties with the United States. However, such tactics were witnessed abroad and no doubt contributed to the American refusal to address the softwood lumber until after the 2006 federal election which produced a Conservative minority government. In this sense, we need to take van Ham’s observation about the rise of state branding internationally and explore how this phenomenon is connected to domestic political branding.

Looking at the Canadian case therefore helps us understand the phenomenon of state branding. The political and economic goals of transformed national narratives must be interpreted in a historical perspective. Looking beyond Canada’s borders help Canadians understand their values and identity. In the Canadian case, national identity is rooted in actions and Canadian foreign policy initiatives and actions should be seen as a source of Canadian values and the Canadian identity. Simply articulating values and goals, but not acting in accordance with them (for whatever reason) undermines this sense of identity and makes it more difficult to manage international relations.

In short, the rethinking of Canada’s place in the world needs to take into account the domestic political dimension of state branding. “State branding,” deemed necessary for economic purposes, may be beneficial politically for the government, for the projection of values and narratives internationally resonates with the fact that many Canadians see acting as a “good” international citizen as an important part of their national identity (Pratt, 1996) (Turenne Sjolander, 1999). Ultimately, however, a “rhetoric-reality gap” (Nimijean, 2006a; Simpson, 2002) can undermine that sense of identity and create problems in Canada’s international relations, whether it be with respect to Canada’s role as an engaged international actor, or whether it addresses the changing nature of the Canadian-American relationship.

The challenge becomes one of figuring out how to communicate national images abroad. Two schools of thought appear to be emerging. A “public relations” school seems preoccupied with communicating national narratives regardless of the policy foundations of such claim, and as I have suggested, there are great risks with this approach. The other approach might see the projection of national narratives as reflective of domestic policy actions and political commitments. A commitment to values can be seen primarily in what a country does, and not by what it exhorts others to do, for it is not possible to control how others perceive your country. The challenge for Canada, therefore, if it wishes to project Canadian values abroad, is to re-examine the international-domestic nexus. Otherwise, brand politics, as Rose (2003) notes, risks harming the democratic discourse and can increase cynicism. This will not only affect Canadians at home; it will affect international perceptions of Canada as well.